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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Bill Gould's latest book, 1 Labored Relations: Law, Politics, and the 
NLRB-A Memoir, 2 operates on several levels. Initially, Labored Relations 
assesses the role of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and its 
tenuous position as an administrative agency serving a quasi-judicial 
function. 3 More enlightening, however, are Gould's revelations about the 
tensions during his Chairmanship between himself, other Board members, 
the General Counsel, and most especially, obstreperous House 
t © 2001, Michael Ashley Stein. 
tt Assistant Professor, College of William & Mary School of Law. Thanks are due to Davison 
Douglas for perceptive comments, and to Jamie Desciak for exceptional research assistance. I am solely 
responsible for the views expressed herein, especially those disparaging the Boston Red Sox. 
I. Previous tomes include WILLIAM B. GoULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FuTuRE OF 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW ( 1993), and WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, 1 APAN 'S RESHAPING 
OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1984). Gould is currently writing the biography of his namesake, an 
escaped slave who served in the Union Navy during the Civil War. 
2. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLmcs, AND THE NLRB-A MEMOIR 
(2000) [hereinafter LABORED RELATIONS]. 
3. The same dynamic exists in a parallel context. See generally James J. Brudney, The Changing 
Workplace: Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 14 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996) 
(discussing the tension between the NLRB and the federal courts regarding collective bargaining). 
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Republicans.4 As a memoir recounting Gould's time in Washington 
through the use of his personal diary, Labored Relations also adds to the 
growing literature of former President Clinton's political nominees who 
have voiced exasperation with partisan politics.5 Written with both charm 
and candor, Labored Relations offers rare insight into the inner workings of 
the NLRB by breaking with prevailing assessments that tend to address 
only specific Board decisions.6 
II. 
POLITICS AT THE NLRB 
Nationally recognized both as a preeminent scholar in the field of labor 
law7 and as an impartial arbitrator,8 Gould's theoretical conception of the 
NLRB prior to his Chairmanship was consistent with that of other lauded 
academics. Specifically, Gould agreed with James Landis that as a matter 
of systemic legitimacy, regulatory agencies must adjudicate their policies 
independent of the other branches.9 His views also harmonized with those 
of Peter Strauss who argues that it is the Chair who ought to "administer the 
agency." 10 Nevertheless, as set forth below, Congressional partisanship and 
4. An earlier appraisal covering much of the same ground is William B. Gould IV, The Labor 
Board's Ever Deepening Somnolence: Some Reflections of a Former Chairman, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
1505 (1999). Similar systemic difficulties were earlier identified by Edward Silver & Joan McAvoy, 
The National Labor Relations Act at the Crossroads, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 181 (1987) (decrying the 
case backlog and lack of expertise among NLRB members). 
5. See, e.g., LAN! GUINIER, LIFr EVERY VOICE: TuRNING A CIVIL RiGHTS SETBACK INTO A NEW 
VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1998) (describing the experiences of having her nomination withdrawn as 
assistant attorney general for civil rights); JOYCELYN M. ELDERS, FROM SHARECROPPER'S DAUGHTER 
TO SURGEON GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1996) (recounting the political life of the 
first African-American Surgeon General). See also John C. Hormel Jr., Defending Gay Dad, THE DES 
MOINES REG., April II, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3202358 (advocating on behalf of his father's 
nomination as ambassador to Luxembourg). 
6. See, e.g., Wilma B. Liebman & Peter J. Hurtgen, The Clinton Board(s): A Panial Look from 
Within, 16 LAB. LAW 43 (2000) (general overview of Clinton Board decisions by two of Gould's former 
Board members); Michael J. Caccavelli, A Too Quick Fix: NLRB One Year Experimental Regulations 
Granting AUs the Power to Dispense with Briefs and Decide Cases from the Bench, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. 
U. 791 (1995) (an analysis of a procedural experiment conducted during Gould's term). Gould's 
successor as Chair, John Truesdale, has followed the traditional course. See generally John C. 
Truesdale, Battling Case Backlogs at the NLRB: The Continuing Problem of Delays in Decision Making 
and the Clinton Board's Response, 16 LAB. LAW. l (2000). 
7. Thus, the appraisal by another prominent labor law scholar that "Professor Gould is one of the 
most prolific and respected labor and employment law scholars in the United States." Charles B. 
Craver, The Clinton Labor Board: Continuing a Tradition of Moderation and Excellence, 16 LAB. LAW. 
123 (2000) [hereinafter The Clinton Labor Board]. 
8. See generally WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, STRIKES, DISPUTE PROCEDURES, AND ARBITRATION: 
ESSAYS ON LABOR LAW (1985). 
9. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). Gould's views are 
elaborated upon in LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 121-48. 
10. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 123. 
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Board members' self-interested actions raised problems of authority'' and 
autonomy 12 throughout Gould's tenure. 
Gould became only the third "outside" (meaning, academic) Chair of 
the NLRB. 13 By contrast, the five-member Board traditionally has been 
comprised of Washington "insiders," namely counsel to Congressional 
committees or attorneys from large D.C. law firms. 14 These insiders 
frequently lack practical industrial relations experience and are unfamiliar 
with labor lawY Even worse, because of their desire to remain in power, 
insider appointees "often devote a considerable portion of their effort and 
energy" to self-promotion and advancement and can be reluctant to perform 
their adjudicative duties when subject to political pressure. 16 
In contrast to the insider model, Gould intended to stay with the NLRB 
for only a single term (which he completed in 1998),17 and did so. 18 
Influencing the decision to restrict his Board tenure was the desire both to 
bring about needed and politically difficult reform, as well as to avoid 
becoming a Washington insider. 19 Gould's outsider status, combined with 
an unsubstantiated perception that he was unfairly inclined towards labor,20 
helped fuel resistance to his nomination, which was approved along mostly 
partisan lines.21 
Beyond Gould's perceived personal ideology, he also garnered 
hostility from House Republicans who associated the Board with steadily 
protecting the interests of organized labor, for they correlated the latter with 
Democratically-inclined voters.ZZ As a result, for the first time in over half 
a century, Democratic nominations for empty Board positions were 
"hatched" together with Republican nominations for collective Senate 
approval. Under this procedure, unused since the Taft-Hartley Act 
increased the number of Board members from three to five, 23 approval of 
II. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 89. 
12. ld. at 112-14, 147-48, 167-68. 
13. His predecessors J. Warren Madden and Harry A. Millis were appointed, respectively, by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt as the first two NLRB Chairmen. ld. at xxi. 
14. ld. 
15. ld. 
16. ld. at 125. The analysis of NLRB's actions from an insider/outsider is derived from G. 
CALVIN MACKENZIE, STARTING OVER: THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS IN 1997, at 39-40 
(Twentieth Century Fund/Century Foundation White Paper, 1997). 
17. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at xxi. 
18. /d. at 255, 295. 
19. Id. at 126, 255, 295. 
20. ld. at 36-37, 46. Gould asserts that these characterizations were the result of a "smear 
campaign." !d. at 26-27. 
21. The final Senate vote was 58-38, with every Democrat and five Republicans voting in Gould's 
favor. /d. at 49. 
22. ld. at 133-34. 
23. See generally Mathew M. Bodah, Congressional Influence on Labor Policy: How Congress 
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Democratic Board nominees was linked to appointment of immoderate 
Republican ones. Consequently, Gould's Board frequently operated at less 
than full strength, since Democratic Senators preferred voting against 
disagreeable pairings. 24 There were also attempts by GOP legislators to cut 
the NLRB 's budget. 25 Partisan driven problems with Congress were to dog 
Gould's term to the extent that, in 1997, Representative David Obey openly 
characterized him as the House Republicans' "Number One Enemy."26 
Although the constituency of the Board would change during Gould's 
tenure, 27 several insiders, appointed through the hatching process and/or 
acting on careerist motivations, were notable for their obstructive tactics. 
Republican Charles Cohen, who "displayed the personality of a bull in a 
china shop,"28 was labeled "Doctor No" by staff members because of his 
truculence. 29 Democrat John Truesdale, who succeeded Gould as Chair, 
was a "consummate senior bureaucrat" whose continued viability on the 
Board owed much to "carefully keeping a finger in the wind."30 Another 
Democrat, Sarah Fox, out of either "political intimidation or her own 
Hamlet-like indecision," would not deliver judgments in difficult casesY 
Gould's greatest stumbling block was Fred Feinstein, Clinton's appointee 
as General Counsel. Although "obsequious to the House Republicans" and 
anyone else in positions of power,32 Feinstein was "secretive," and diverged 
with Gould over issues of "ideology and turf."33 Feinstein also frequently 
undercut Gould's reform efforts by attempting to usurp the Chair's 
administrative prerogatives.34 
A major area of controversy during Gould's tenure, and one that brings 
Has Influenced Outcomes Without Changing the Law (paper delivered at the 51" Annual Meeting of the 
Industrial Relations Research Association, New York, January 5, 1999). 
24. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 39-40. 
25. /d. at 127, 164, 195-96, 199, 202, 205, 209-10, 266,401. 
26. /d. at xxiii. The epithet entitles the chapter describing further politically motivated fracases. 
!d. at 255-86. 
27. The five-year terms are staggered, with the intention of ensuring ideological balance. See 
generally Teny A. Bethel & Catherine Melfi, The Failure of Gissel Bargaining Orders, 14 HOFSTRA 
LAB. L.J. 423, 430 (1997). 
28. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 55. 
29. !d. 
30. /d. at 55-56. Nevertheless, one of the more significant NLRB decisions of recent times was 
handed down during his tenure. See Boston Medical Center Corporation, 330 N.L.R.B. 30 (1999) 
(holding that medical interns and residents working for private hospitals are "employees" rather than 
"students"), overruling Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976). This 
reconceptualization had long been advocated. Charles B. Craver, The Application of Labor and 
Antitrust Laws to Physician Unions: The Need for a Re-evaluation of Traditional Concepts in a 
Radically Changing Field, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 55 (1975). 
31. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 142-45. 
32. /d. at 54. 
33. ld. at 54-55. 
34. /d. at 89 (recounting Feinstein's attempt to share control of committee appointments). 
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to the fore the complicated intra-governmental relations of the Board, was 
his public opposition, in his role as NLRB Chairman, to California 
Proposition 226 (Prop. 226).35 This proposal, which was defeated in a June 
1998 ballot initiative,36 would have required labor unions to garner express 
authorization from all their represented workers prior to spending dues for 
political purposes.37 In part because the statute would have been 
administered by California state courts rather than by the NLRB (and thus 
preempt the Board's jurisdiction),38 Gould felt strongly enough about its 
effects to issue a written statement to a joint legislative hearing in 
Sacramento.39 An additional objection to Prop. 226 was that it was flawed 
from a policy perspective in seeking to prevent unions' political 
participation,40 an activity expressly protected under the National Labor 
Relations Act.41 Gould also felt that Prop. 226 was misleading to California 
voters since its passage was only necessary if the Board was not enforcing 
the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Communications Workers v. Beck 42 
under which nonmember workers were permitted to object to the 
expenditure of political dues.43 Bipartisan political attacks ensued, with 
Republicans ardently supporting Prop. 226 because it would cut unions' 
financial support of Democratic campaigns,44 and Democrats incensed over 
the attention that Prop. 226 drew to a major source of their funding.45 
Ironically, it was the 1988-94 Republican-appointed Boards who had failed 
to issue a single Beck case.46 By contrast, Gould's Board issued nearly 
twenty.47 The most significant of their Beck decisions was California Saw 
& Knife, 48 which compelled unions as part of their collective bargaining 
agreements to notify members of their nonobligation to have dues utilized 
for non-representation purposes.49 
35. ld. at xvii-xviii, 267-74, 303. 
36. llana DeBare, Voters, Unions Combine to Beat Prop. 226, WASH. POST, June 3, 1998, at Al9. 
37. The relevant text is set forth in LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 395 n. I. 
38. ld. at 268. 
39. For the full text, see id. at 386-96. 
40. Jd. at 268. 
41. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976), amended by Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act. 
42. 487 U.S. 735 (1988). 
43. /d. Their power to object, Gould reasoned, obviated the necessity for a more intricate 
procedure under which express spending authorizations were required. 
44. 'Specially nasty were Rep. Ernest Istook's accusations that Gould had lied to a Congressional 
committee on that subject. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at xxvii. 
45. Expressed, for instance, in an irate phone call from Congressman David Obey. Id at 269-70. 
46. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 267. 
47. See /d. at 410-20 for exegeses of the more significant ones. 
48. 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub. nom. Assn. of International Machinists v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 
1012 (7th Cir. 1998). 
49. /d. The case, which had other implications, is described in greater detail in LABORED 
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III. 
HARDBALLATTHENLRB 
The most widely known case of Gould's Chairmanship was the 
Board's contribution to the Major League Baseball strike negotiations 
during 1994-95.50 An avid baseball fan51 for whom few pleasures in life 
exceed that of "the thrill of the grass,"52 Gould was both knowledgeable 
about53 and deeply interested in resolving the dispute.54 Following 
expiration of the players' and owners' 55 collective bargaining agreement, 
difficult negotiations ensued. In sum, the owners sought a uniform salary 
cap, ostensibly to maintain the economic and competitive viability of 
smaller market clubs, but also to reclaim part of the free agency rights won 
by players in a 1975 arbitration case.56 The players' union, adamantly in 
favor of maintaining the unencumbered salary structure, countered that the 
owners could address their concerns by sharing their own revenues among 
themselves.57 Little progress having been made in their talks with the 
owners, the ballplayers struck mid-season and "the unthinkable 
transpired-the World Series was canceled" for the first time since 1904.58 
Resulting negotiations were similarly sluggish, reaching an impasse in late 
December. The players then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the 
RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 390-91, 411-12. 
50. See generally DIAMOND MINES: BASEBALL & LABOR (Paul D. Staudohar ed. 2000). 
51. Albeit one misled both in his loyalty to the team from Boston, as well as in his skepticism of 
the empirically proven doom that precludes their success. WILLIAM B. GoULD IV, BASEBALL AND THE 
SULTAN OF SWAT: THE CURSE OF THE BAMBINO (1995) in LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 353-
61. See generally DAN SHAUGHNESSY, THE CURSE OF THE BAMBINO (1990). 
52. The phrase originates with W. P. Kinsella, whose many baseball-related books include 
SHOELESS JOE (1999), THE IOWA BASEBALL CONFEDERACY (1996), and THE THRILL OF THE GRASS 
(1985). The film FIELD OF DREAMS, based upon the novel SHOELESS JOE, brought the expression to 
wider public notice. See FIELD OF DREAMS (MCA Home Video 1989) (happily on file with author). 
Many thanks to Keith McArthur of B. Macabee's Booksellers for confirming this information with 
Kinsella, as well as for keeping his books in stock. 
53. Having taught for years a course on sports Jaw at Stanford Law School, arbitrating player 
salary disputes, and also writing broadly in the field. See, e.g., LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 
102; William B. Gould IV, Baseball and Globalization: The Game Played and Heard and Watched 
'Round the World' (With Apologies to Soccer and Bobby Thomson), 8 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 85 
(2000); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (1986). 
54. Recording in his diary that mediating the dispute would be "a job which I would Jove if only I 
wasn't supposed to adjudicate." LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 108. See also William B. Gould 
IV & Robert C. Berry, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, Duress, Brawls, and 
Strikes, in SPORTS AND THE LAW: A MODERN ANTHOLOGY 126 (Timothy Davis et al. eds. 1999) 
(relating Gould's view of the strike). 
55. Known formally as the Major League Players' Association and the Players' Relations 
Committee, respectively. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 101. 
56. /d. See also Professional Baseball Clubs and Baseball Players Assn., 66 LAB. ARBITRATION 
101 (1975). 
57. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 102. 
58. ld. at 109. 
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Board's New York regional office. 59 President Clinton intervened by 
appointing former Secretary of Labor W.J. Usery as Special Mediator, but 
Usery's efforts at reconciliation likewise failed. 60 
Before the Board could adjudicate the issue, it had to be investigated 
by General Counsel Feinstein, who was "deliberately dragging his heels" 
over the unfair labor practice allegation. Odder still, he proposed that they 
"disguise" the separate roles of the NLRB and General Counsel in order to 
create a false public impression that Feinstein spoke for the Board. Such 
action would insulate Feinstein from political fallout if he recommended 
that the Board approve the issuance of a IO(j) injunction.61 Not 
surprisingly, Gould rejected this suggestion.62 In the end, Feinstein advised 
in favor of issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO), and the Board 
approved his recommendation by a 3-2 vote.63 A decision on the merits, 
however, was only reached after protracted political and interpersonal 
tribulations over whether a television camera crew would be allowed to film 
the proceedings. Future Chair Truesdale "excoriated" Gould with "verbal 
abuse";64 Member Cohen exhibited "almost-puerile obsessions and 
resentment of the press's focus" on him. 65 As a result, the Board voted 4-1 
to avoid journalistic contact on the case.66 
NLRB regional counsel Dan Silverman made the request for a IO(j) 
injunction before Judge Sotomayor of the Southern District of New York, 
who issued the TRO in an elegant opinion imbued with appreciation of the 
game.67 A Second Circuit panel unanimously affirmed the decision.68 
Because of the injunction, the 1995 and 1996 seasons ran their course.69 In 
late 1996, the players and owners reached a comprehensive collective 
59. !d. For a discussion of this procedure, see BRENT GARREN, ET AL., How TO TAKE A CASE 
BEFORE THE NLRB 13-32 (7th ed. 2000). 
60. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 111-12. 
61. /d. at 112-13. See also GARREN, ET AL., supra note 59 (describing how lO(j) injunctions are 
issued prophylactically). 
62. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 113. 
63. /d. at 113-14, 116. 
64. !d. at 115-16. 
65. /d. at 115. 
66. /d. at 116. 
67. !d. at 117-18. For example, Judge Sotomayor noted that: 
The often leisurely game of baseball is filled with many small moments 
which can catch a fan's breath. There is, for example, that wonderful 
second when you see an outfielder backpedaling and jumping up to 
the wall and time stops for an instant as he jumps up and you finally 
figure out whether it is a home run, a double, or a single off the wall, 
or an out. 
/d. at 118, quoting Jude Sotomayor. 
68. Voting 3-0. Silverman v. Major League Baseball, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995). 
69. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 119. 
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bargaining agreement,70 and Gould was praised in many circles for 
preserving the national pastime.71 
Gould's tenure at the NLRB reached a personal nadir when he was 
accused of travelling on government business for the purpose of attending 
baseball games.72 This allegation was part of a continuing GOP 
investigation into the Board's putative travel abuse,73 during which time 
Board members were quizzed on how they occupied themselves while on 
speaking engagements.74 The extent of these accusations is evidenced by a 
letter sent to Gould by two House Republicans demanding that he "identify 
'Dusty' by gender, position, and relationship to the San Francisco Giants, if 
any."75 In reply, Gould informed the Congressmen that Dusty Baker was 
male, and due to his managing the ballclub in question, maintained a 
"prominent and important" position with the team. 76 Perusing the 
interrogatory at a later time, Baker remarked that the inquisitive legislators 
"simply wanted to see if [Gould] had a girlfriend with the Giants!"77 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The aftermath of Gould's tenure as NLRB Chair is beginning to 
receive critical attention. I agree with those scholars, most notably Charles 
Craver/8 who write with approbation of Gould's period in public service.79 
Under his leadership, the Board initiated innovations that allowed 
administrative law judges to issue bench rulings,80 permitted unions to 
utilize postal election ballots,81 and created an advisory panel comprised of 
labor and management lawyers. 82 Sitting as a quasi-judicial body, the 
70. !d. The agreement, which expires after the 2001 season, is causing similar tribulations as of 
this writing. Chris DeLuca, Expect Coming Labor Conflict to be Fought Among Owners, CHIC. SUN 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2001, at 109. For a broad, international, and interdisciplinary examination of the sport's 
future, see David. P. Findler, Symposium: Baseball in the Global Era: Economic, Legal, and Cultural 
Perspectives, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 1 et seq. (2000). 
71. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 120. 
72. Initiated by Rep. John Boehner in early 1996, the accusation was carried forward by Rep. 
Christopher Shays. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 220-21, 246, 254. 
73. /d. at 26-27, 36-37, 39, 45, 47. 
74. /d. at 230. 
75. /d. 
76. /d. 
77. /d. 
78. The Clinton Labor Board, supra note 7. 
79. International esteem also exists. See e.g., JOHN COLE, A QUIET AMERICAN MANCHESTER 
GUARDIAN 17 (2001) (former BBC political editor praising Gould's tenure). 
80. LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 58-59, 63-64, 79, 298, 300. 
81. /d. at 84-85. 
82. /d. at 51-52. 
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NLRB expanded the use of lOU) TROs,83 commenced administrative 
enforcement of the Beck decision,84 and rendered decisions in an 
evenhanded manner that at times benefited both unions and management.85 
Equally impressive was the Gould Board's expedition of backlogged cases 
at an unprecedented rate, despite internal politics and Board member 
vacancies caused by nomination hatching. 86 
Nevertheless, there is no shortage of commentators who take Gould to 
task for many of the political and interpersonal difficulties described above 
that arose during his term.87 Only time will tell with which perception law 
professors and labor historians will align themselves, and, more 
immediately, whether the various Boards under the Bush administration 
will choose to follow their predecessors' lead. In the interim, Gould can 
surely find consolation at the criticisms leveled against him in baseball 
great Reggie Jackson's aphorism that they "don't boo nobodies."88 
83. !d. at 178-85. 
84. !d. passim. 
85. /d. passim. 
86. !d. at 287-92, setting forth in both textual and graphic form, the results of an independent 
Inspector General's report. 
87. See, e.g., Andrew M. Kramer, The Clinton Board: Difficult Times for a Management 
Representative, 16 LAB. LAW. 75 (2000) (maintaining that the Gould Board was politically biased 
against management concerns); Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation 
of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2000) (asserting that Gould's personality, rather than 
his academic outsider status, was responsible for both internal and external NLRB frictions); Joan Flynn, 
Expertness for What? The Gould Years at the NLRB and the Irrepressible Myth of the "Independent 
Agency," 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 465 (2000) (same). In the former article, Flynn discloses that she was 
staff counsel to Republican Board member Cohen. 
88. The Baseball Almanac, at http://www.baseball-almanac.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2001). 
Jackson entered the Hall of Fame as a member of the New York Yankees. /d. 
